The toolkit for combating disinformation has been significantly expanded with the adoption of the Code of Conduct, its amendment in 2022, and its incorporation into the Digital Services Act in 2025. However, political changes in the United States are causing considerable uncertainty regarding the effective application of European regulatory and policy instruments. Monitoring the enforcement of the Code of Conduct in recent years has already shown that platforms are more concerned with formal compliance than with achieving the actual objectives of the regulation. The implementation of the commitments made under the Code of Conduct began during the term of the EDMO, including the Lakmusz-HDMO. During this time, there would have been an opportunity to fine-tune the implementation and see the actual results.

The experiences of Lakmusz-HDMO do not warrant excessive optimism. Neither the availability of information on abuses related to Hungary on the platforms nor the consistency of the platforms' actions against abuses has increased significantly.

Hungary differs from all other EU member states in that the primary and most important source of disinformation is the state itself. This is clearly reflected in the amount of resources (from public funds) allocated to spreading disinformation, the party's propaganda-focused nature of the disinformation, and the constant questioning of the legitimacy of the fight against disinformation. The effectiveness and realistic goals of the project are fundamentally reinterpreted by the fact that our analyses and critiques focus on the activities of our government.

During the project period, European Parliament and local elections took place in Hungary. As a result, research findings related to political advertising and digital political communication constitute a significant part of the project's results.

The legal arsenal for combating disinformation has recently been expanded with two new European regulations. The European Media Freedom Act and the Regulation on the transparency and targeted continuation of political advertising will both profoundly shape the legal environment for the dissemination of disinformation from the second half of 2025 onwards.

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