A STRUCTURED REVIEW OF RESEARCH CONDUCTED BETWEEN 2018 AND 2026

The April 12, 2026 parliamentary election brought a significant political shift in Hungary—one that may also reshape the actors, channels, and diffusion dynamics of the disinformation ecosystem. For precisely this reason, the knowledge accumulated about the preceding period does not lose its relevance: it serves as a reference point against which the changes now beginning can be measured and interpreted.

Accordingly, this review is at once a synthesis and a snapshot: it brings together the domestic and international research of roughly the past eight years (2018–2026), capturing the situation as it stood before the election. It serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, it is a reference baseline against which future developments can be measured; on the other, it helps pinpoint the areas where existing knowledge is incomplete and where new research is needed. This paper summarizes the key findings; the detailed data are available in the cited studies.

The sources analyzed come predominantly from two groups. The first is the body of pan-European surveys—the studies of the European Commission and the European Parliament—which make it possible to benchmark Hungary against the EU. The second comprises the research of Political Capital and HDMO (whose consortium leader is Political Capital). In addition, we drew on a relevant survey by the NMHH (the Hungarian National Media and Infocommunications Authority). The composition of this source base is therefore itself an interpretive frame: the paper rests primarily on research measuring public perception, attitudes, susceptibility, and media literacy.

Reading the sources together also yields an important methodological lesson. The surveys on perceived exposure are largely consistent: Hungary ranks among the highest time and again. A single study stands apart—the face-to-face Protecting and Promoting Democracy survey (SP568, 2025)—which places the country in the middle of the field, a reminder that the mode of data collection can influence the results. In addition, self-reported knowledge and detection ability tend to be biased upward. We therefore always interpret the data together with the mode of data collection—online (CAWI), telephone (CATI), or face-to-face (CAPI) questionnaires.

The review follows the arc of perception – susceptibility – resilience. We first examine how exposed to disinformation the public feels (perception); then how susceptible people actually are and which groups in society are most so (susceptibility); and finally what protects against it and how real that protection is (resilience).

In a cross-EU comparison, the Hungarian public is among the top-ranked in perceived exposure and is also more confident than average in recognizing disinformation. At the same time, susceptibility to disinformation is high: politically charged misperceptions and narratives are not isolated but form a coherent system, often organized along partisan lines. This vulnerability is pronounced at both ends of the age spectrum, for different reasons: among young people, overconfidence; among older adults, the limits of verification routines, specific digital skills, and supportive relationships may pose the risk. The 2026 campaign, in turn, brought an intensive, deliberately deceptive political use of artificial intelligence.

From this structured review of the research conducted between 2018 and 2026, the following four main system-level lessons, as well as directions for future research, can be identified:

1. System-level lessons

Partisan belief systems and “fake news” as a weapon: Politically charged misperceptions form an interlocking system that is strongly shaped by political conviction. In a hyperpolarized environment, the notion of “fake news” often becomes a synonym for disagreement and a tool of political stigmatization: a segment of the public is inclined to interpret the other camp’s messages as disinformation.

The gap between perceived and actual ability (overconfidence): A recurring motif across the studies is the “third-person effect.” The public—especially young and highly educated people—tends to substantially overestimate its own resilience while assuming that others can be deceived; in reality, confidence and actual detection ability are largely decoupled.

Factual relativism and general erosion of certainty: A particularly deep risk stems from the widespread presence of factual relativism, in which facts themselves become a matter of perspective and the logic of “this is my truth” overrides verifiable evidence. This disposition not only undermines the effectiveness of debunking but also leads to a general erosion of certainty toward news sources and to declining trust in media platforms. Encountering disinformation thus erodes the credibility of the entire news environment, weakening genuine, trustworthy information as well.

Methodological biases: The surveys are largely consistent, but the mode of data collection (online, telephone, or face-to-face) can meaningfully shift the figures, while self-reported knowledge and detection tend to be biased upward. The data therefore often reveal patterns and risk factors rather than direct causal conclusions.

2. Research gaps and post-2026 directions

The existing domestic knowledge base remains incomplete in several respects:

The April 2026 election has created a significant new situation in Hungary’s political and governmental space, one that is expected to shape the disinformation ecosystem as well. In this new era, an important research task is the rapid identification and mapping of new disinformation actors, sources, and distribution channels, which can directly reduce society’s exposure to manipulative content. Continuously monitoring this new situation—measured against the pre-election “snapshot” set down in this paper as a starting baseline—may be one of the most important scholarly and monitoring tasks for HDMO in the period ahead.

The full report is available here.